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Anomaly detection aims at finding patterns in data that do not conform to the expected behavior. It is 
largely adopted in intrusion detection systems, relying on unsupervised algorithms that have the potential 
to detect zero-day attacks; however, efficacy of algorithms varies depending on the observed system and 
the attacks. Selecting the algorithm that maximizes detection capability is a challenging task with no 
master key. This paper tackles the challenge above by devising and applying a methodology to identify 
relations between attack families, anomaly classes and algorithms. The implication is that an unknown 
attack belonging to a specific attack family is most likely to get observed by unsupervised algorithms that 
are particularly effective on such attack family. This paves the way to rules for the selection of algorithms 
based on the identification of attack families. The paper proposes and applies a methodology based on 
analytical and experimental investigations supported by a tool to i) identify which anomaly classes are 
most likely raised by the different attack families, ii) study suitability of anomaly detection algorithms to 
detect anomaly classes, iii) combine previous results to relate anomaly detection algorithms and attack 
families, and iv) define guidelines to select unsupervised algorithms for intrusion detection. 
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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2. Introduction 
Modern systems such as cyber-physical infrastructures,
ystems-of-Systems or Cloud environments may be targeted
y cyber-attacks, requiring attentive security countermeasures.
ntrusion Detectors (IDs, [2,24] ) were proposed to enhance security
y analysing system data, aiming at identifying error-prone, ma-
icious or unauthorised activities. IDs may apply signature-based
echniques [2] , which consist of checking properties or looking for
atterns ( signatures ) in monitored data to detect the manifestation
f a fault, or an ongoing attack. 
Signature-based approaches have good detection capabilities
hen dealing with known faults or attacks [1,2] , but they may fail
n identifying unknown faults. In addition, when an unknown fault
r a zero-day attack [28,29] (i.e., an attack that exploit novel or
ndiscovered system vulnerabilities) is revealed, a new signature
ust be promptly devised and added to the signatures set. 
To deal with unknowns, research moved to techniques suited to
etect unseen, novel attacks. Anomaly detectors are based on the∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: tommaso.zoppi@unifi.it (T. Zoppi), andrea.ceccarelli@unifi.it 
(A. Ceccarelli), andrea.bondavalli@unifi.it (A. Bondavalli). 
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214-2126/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article ussumption that an attack generates observable deviations from
he expected behavior, and they aim at finding patterns in data
hat do not conform to the expected behavior of a system [1] : such
atterns are known as anomalies . Once an expected behavior is
efined, anomaly detectors target deviations from such expecta-
ions, protecting against known attacks [35,58] zero-day attacks
26,28] emerging threats [15,54] and enhancing existing algorithms
56] . In this paper we focus on unsupervised anomaly detection al-
orithms, which are suited to detect, among others, zero-day attacks ,
ith no need of labels in training data [9,24] . 
Alongside with an appropriate quality of input data, selecting
he correct detection algorithm(s) represents a key decision when
efining an anomaly detector. Since IDs should be configured and
ustomized to suit the target system, adequate strategies to guide
he selection of appropriate anomaly detection algorithms may
upport and speedup the process. However, a clear support to this
election process in the domain of IDs is currently not available.
he scarcity of valid guidelines is mainly due to difficulties in ex-
racting common characteristics of either attacks or algorithms , which
orces ad-hoc customizations. 
Our contribution. This paper investigates which anomalies are
enerated when attacks occur, and determines which algorithms
re more suited to detect specific anomaly classes. Consequently,
ur study allows determining which algorithms are more suited to de-nder the CC BY-NC-ND license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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gtect certain attacks . On top of that, the paper generalize this result,
presenting the connection between attack families and anomaly
classes: the implication is that it is possible to select anomaly de-
tection algorithms that are particularly suited to detect attacks,
even unknown ones, as long as these attacks belong to the same
family. This ultimately provides guidelines to identify the most suit-
able unsupervised algorithms for anomaly-based intrusion detection
for a given attack model. 
We substantiate our results through a multi-level study, which
devises initial conjectures that are then confirmed or denied by
both inspection of data and by experimental campaigns. Briefly, we
proceed as follows. First we report on anomaly classes and attack
families according to reference taxonomies. This allows identify-
ing which anomaly classes are generated when attacks occur. Such
analysis is based on inspection of known attacks datasets typically
used for testing IDs, along with appropriate experimental cam-
paigns. Then, we define which algorithms are more suited to detect
certain anomaly classes, exploring their characteristics and exercis-
ing them using databases in which we injected different anomaly
classes. We select unsupervised algorithms belonging to different
families [1,5,48] , building a pool of algorithms with heterogeneous
characteristics. Moreover, we favor well-known and consolidated
algorithms with availability of public implementations rather than
recent findings. This allows evaluating how the baseline idea be-
hind algorithms belonging to different families suits the detection
of specific classes of anomalies. 
To corroborate the partial results obtained at the previous steps
- and deriving guidelines - algorithms are connected to attack fam-
ilies, executing the selected algorithms on well-known intrusion
datasets. Data generated or presented in the paper is publicly avail-
able [21] , as well as the tool used for the experiments [36] , allow-
ing to reproduce experiments as needed. 
Paper Structure. This paper is structured as follows: Section 2
presents basics and related works, while Section 3 describes the
methodology we used throughout the paper. Section 4 expands on
anomaly classes generated by attack families; Section 5 digresses
on suitability of algorithms in detecting anomaly classes, while the
studies above are consolidated in Section 6. Section 7 proposes
guidelines to apply our study in IDs design, letting Section 8 to
conclude the paper, elaborating on future works. 
2. Basics and related works 
2.1. Anomaly-Based intrusion detection 
Aiming at protecting cyber-physical systems, security specialists
are continuously researching mechanisms and strategies that aim
at neutralizing an attack or mitigating its adverse effects. Regard-
less of their characteristics, attacks [26,27] should be timely identi-
fied to activate reaction mechanisms that specifically aim at block-
ing an ongoing attack, or protecting critical data. 
To such extent, many IDs were proposed in the literature -
and often distributed as enterprise software – to prevent attack-
ers from exploiting security breaches, or vulnerabilities. Significant
effort was put in comparing anomaly detection algorithms: for ex-
ample, in [52] authors used 7 algorithms on a dataset contain-
ing HTTP traffic. Instead, in [35] , authors presented a compara-
tive study for IDs where k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN), Mahalanobis -
based, Local Outlier Factor (LOF) and one-class Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM) were evaluated using the DARPA 98 dataset. Four al-
gorithms are evaluated in [51] , which presents a review of novelty
detection methods that are classified as semi-supervised or unsu-
pervised. Additionally, in [5] , authors presented a comparison of
anomaly detection algorithms for multivariate data points. In this
case, 19 algorithms were evaluated using 10 different datasets from
different areas. Instead, in [48] , authors focus on quantitative com-arisons of unsupervised algorithms for intrusion detection, draw-
ng conclusions about the effectiveness of algorithms on different
atasets. 
However, changing the target system, domain or attack model
equires that the process of building the IDS to re-start from
cratch. Therefore, in this paper we expand on the investigation on
etection capabilities of algorithms, and on how different attacks
enerate anomaly classes, aiming at achieving general guidelines
o select unsupervised algorithms when building IDs. 
.2. Unsupervised anomaly detection 
In the paper we will name data point the observation of the
tate of the system at a given instant . Each data point is composed
y f feature values, which are processed by an anomaly detection
lgorithm to determine if the data point exhibits anomalies. More
n detail, anomalies are rare data points that may be classified as
1] : 
• point anomaly (outlier): a data point that is out of scope or not
compliant with the trend of a variable e.g., out-of-size payload
of a network packet; 
• contextual anomaly: a data point that is unexpected in a specific
context e.g., low number of page faults while loading a program
for the first time; 
• collective anomaly: a collection of related data points that is
anomalous with respect to the entire trend or dataset e.g., sub-
sequent ICMP requests in a short interval of time. 
Different anomaly detectors may be instantiated depending on
he nature of the target system [1] and monitored data. If labeled
raining data is available, supervised anomaly detection [57,58,61] or
emi-supervised may be adopted [25] . Labelled data points allow
raining an algorithm using both expected and anomalous data
oints that have already been reported. Another slightly different
pproach embraces ensembles [59,60] , which are executed simul-
aneously, and the results they individually obtain are merged to-
ether to obtain the final class to be assigned to a give data point.
t is worth noticing that feeding the algorithm with anomalies due
o known attacks makes it learning how such attacks differ from
xpectations, disregarding the detection of anomalies due to un-
een attacks. Instead, when training data is not available or la-
eled, the only option is an unsupervised anomaly detection ap-
roach [5,24] . 
Noticeably, when configuring an anomaly detector for a target
ystem, we can assume that a fully labeled training set will not be
vailable in most of the cases due to i) lack of trustable labeling
echniques, ii) difficulties in gathering reliable data, or iii) dynamic
nd evolving characteristics of the system and its workload, calling
or adaptive data analysis solutions. As a consequence, the appli-
ability of supervised algorithms may not be guaranteed in sev-
ral scenarios, calling the adoption of techniques that are able to
eal with the scarcity of labels in training data. In addition, con-
olidated supervised algorithms may and should be used alongside
ith algorithms that are able to deal also with unknown attacks,
uilding ensembles [59,60] or - more in general - IDSs that are
ble to identify a broader span of attacks. Therefore, in this paper
e refer only to unsupervised algorithms . 
.3. Families of unsupervised algorithms 
We describe here six families of unsupervised algorithms typ-
cally acknowledged in the literature [1,5] , reporting their main
haracteristics. It is worth noticing that there are some unavoidable
emantic overlaps among families. For example, neighbor-based
trategies may be used to improve the detection capabilities of al-
orithms as in the angle-based FastABOD [4] . 
T. Zoppi, A. Ceccarelli and L. Salani et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 52 (2020) 102474 3 
Fig. 1. Motivation of the Study, along with the methodology (steps A-E). 
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i  Clustering algorithms [11] partition a set of data points in such
 way that data points in the same group (cluster) share similar
haracteristics. Data points that cannot be assigned to any of the
xisting clusters, or that do not met specific inclusion criteria, are
nomalous. 
Neighbor-based algorithms learn by analogy: they label a data
oint as anomalous or expected depending on the label of its near-
st neighbor(s), considering an f -dimensional space [6,7] . In unsu-
ervised mode, they use the distance of the data point from its
eighbors as anomaly score. 
Angle-based algorithms relate data to high-dimensional spaces,
nd measure the variance in the angles between the data point
o the other points [4] . Expected data points have a large angle
ariance, while anomalies typically result in very small variance of
riples of points. 
Classification algorithms identify the class a new data point de-
ending on information collected during previous activities e.g., as-
igning a given email into spam or non-spam classes. Despite they
ere born for supervised setups, they can run unsupervised [9] . 
Density-based algorithms [10] estimate the density of the
eighborhood of each data point. When a data point differs from
he expectations, it lies in a low-density area and it is then labeled
s anomalous. 
Statistical algorithms assume that expected data points occur
n high probability regions of a given statistical distribution. They
t a distribution to the expected points, and then apply statistical
nference to determine if a novel data point belongs to this distri-
ution or not. In unsupervised mode, statistical algorithms [3] de-
ive the underlying distribution as data is computed. 
. Methodology 
This section lists the main steps of the experimental method-
logy we propose and apply in the paper. Such steps describe the
election of algorithms, datasets, attacks, metrics and tool support,
roviding the pillars to build our analysis by means of qualita-
ive and quantitative studies . The former aims to define hypothe-
es and conjectures based on literature reviews or manual inspec-
ions, which are scrutinized by the latter through experimental
ampaigns. Our methodology is depicted in Fig. 1 . 
Step A. Alg orithms Selection . We select an unsupervised anomaly
etection algorithm for each of the families above by surveying
hat researchers and practitioners proposed and in the literature.
lgorithms must have been applied for intrusion detection in the
ast. 
Step B. Dataset selection. Algorithms will be exercised on pub-
ic datasets obtained by monitoring systems and reporting on ef-
ects of either real or simulated attacks on these systems. Datasets
hould be adequately documented, recent, or widely used in the
ast in similar studies. Step C. Attack s classification. Attacks contained in the datasets
hould be classified according to a unified attack model, partition-
ng them into families according to their intrinsic characteristics. 
Step D. Metrics identification. Then, we define metrics to score
nd compare the results of algorithms when applied to datasets.
e select a reference metric, reporting also the values of metrics
sed in most of the other studies to allow state-of-the-art compar-
sons. 
Step E. Exp erimental Setup and Tool Support. We select one or
ore tools that can support quantitative and, where needed, qual-
tative analyses. Similar analyses should be supported by the same
ool, to limit variability of results e.g., the same implementation
f an algorithm should be used. Moreover, the same environment
hould be defined and used to run experiments with tool support. 
After defining the main steps of the methodology, a target of
ach study needs to be identified. Then, qualitative and quantita-
ive analyses can be carried out, providing results to be used for
iscussion. Three separate studies will be carried out from Section
 to Section 6. More in detail, Section 4 will report on Attack Fami-
ies That Generate Anomaly Classes , Section 5 will expand on Detect-
ng Anomaly Classes , while in Section 6 we will be Applying Algo-
ithms to Datasets . As it is shown in Fig. 1 , tool support (step E) is
eeded to conduct the three analyses. 
.1. Step A: algorithms selection 
Our selection criteria favor well-known, consolidated algorithms
ith public implementations. Despite technical advancements that
ay have been proposed by domain experts, we assume that al-
orithms belonging to a given family share intrinsic strengths and
eaknesses that may be mitigated, but that cannot be removed
t all. Comparing consolidated versions of algorithms allow us to
valuate how the baseline idea behind the algorithms of a given
amily suits the detection of specific classes of anomalies. The se-
ected algorithms, one for each family in Section 2.3, are described
elow. 
Neighbor-based: ODIN. Stemming from the k-th Nearest Neigh-
our (kNN) [7] , this distance-based method was designed to iden-
ify point anomalies. For each data point, kNN examines the whole
ataset to determine their feature distances to the given point. This
llows isolating k nearest neighbors (NN), creating the so-called
NN graph . The Outlier Detection using Indegree Number (ODIN, [6] )
lgorithm improves kNN by defining as anomalies the data points
hat have a low number of in-adjacent edges in the kNN graph. 
Clustering: KMeans. K-means [11] assigns data points to k sub-
ets, or clusters , by their feature values. First, k centroids are ran-
omly initialized and each data point is assigned to the cluster
ith the nearest centroid. Centroids may be updated, fitting evolv-
ng scenarios also in unsupervised mode. Finally, data points that
4 T. Zoppi, A. Ceccarelli and L. Salani et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 52 (2020) 102474 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Datasets used in this study. 
Dataset Data Points Attacks %Attacks Features 
KDD Cup 99 (KC) [34] 311.028 223.298 72 41 
NSL-KDD (NK) [16] 148.503 71.280 48 42 
ISCX2012 (IX) [17] 571.698 66.813 12 17 
UNSW-NB15 (UN) [14] 175.341 119.341 68 46 
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them. are too far from the centroid of their cluster are labeled as anoma-
lies. There are many possible variants of this algorithm. 
Angle-based: FastABOD. FastABOD anomalous data points de-
pending on the angles between pairs of distance vectors to other
points [4] . For each data point, the algorithm first calculates the
Angle Based Outlier Factor (ABOF) to its k-nearest neighbor as the
normalized scalar product of the difference vectors of any triple
of neighbors. According to [4] , the usage of kNN provides a better
approximation. Then, FastABOD ranks the data points according to
their ABOF. The smaller the ABOF, the bigger the probability that
the data point represents an anomaly. 
Classification: One-Class SVM. This algorithm conducts semi-
supervised anomaly detection [1] aiming to learn a decision
boundary [8] . However, One-Class SVMs can be used for unsuper-
vised anomaly detection: a support vector machine is trained with
the dataset and each data point is classified considering the nor-
malized distance of the data point from the determined boundary
[9] . 
Density-based: LOF. Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [10] computes
the kNN for each data point, and use them to calculate the density
index, called Local Reachability Density (LRD). The anomaly score is
then obtained by comparing the LRD of a data point with the LRD
of its kNN. Expected data points have scores close to 1.0, while
anomalies usually result in bigger scores. 
Statistical: HBOS. This approach [3] generates a histogram for
each feature by using the values of all the available data points.
The anomaly score is computed by multiplying the inverse heights
of the columns in which each feature of the data point reside. Such
technique assumes that the investigated features are independent,
making HBOS fast even when dealing with large datasets [5] . If fea-
tures are dependent, such dependencies need to be neglected. 
Computational Complexity. Despite not central to our selection
process, we report here some information on the computational
complexity of the selected algorithms. The complexity of density-
based and angle-based algorithms is at least O(N 2 ), or rather the
complexity of an NN query. Clustering is generally more efficient,
with complexity of O(k N), where k represents the number of clus-
ters. S tatistical and classification families may have very different
complexities; therefore it is not easy to present a bound. How-
ever, statistical algorithms are usually sub-linear e.g., O(N log N)
for HBOS , while classifiers usually build complex structures or con-
duct complex calculations e.g., OneClassSVM , O(N 2 ). 
3.2. Step B: selection of the datasets 
The datasets initial selection requires them to contain enough
data points to ensure statistical evidence when evaluating the al-
gorithms e.g., DARPA 1999 dataset [30] was discarded since it
contains only 201 data points related to attacks, while ADFA-LD
[55] contains just the number of system calls as usable feature.
Furthermore, labels must be certain and not be assigned by clas-
sification algorithms or thresholds, to avoid biases due to mis-
takes in the labeling process. Consequently, we disregard datasets
as MAWI [31] or DEFCON [33] , which are constituted of sniffed
data that is labeled applying classification algorithms. Last, data
points should be complete for all the features in the datasets, to
avoid applying feature recovery strategies that may bias results. 
3.2.1. Selected datasets 
The selected datasets are shortly described below and reported
in Table 1 . We match each dataset to an acronym that will be used
throughout the paper. As a side note, during our selection pro-
cess we discarded Kyoto2006 + [32] NGIDS-DS [33] and ADFA-LD
[55] datasets, since their amount of data was too huge to be pro-
cessed to a meaningful percentage. (KC) KDD Cup 99 (1999) [34] . This is the most popular dataset
n the anomaly-based intrusion detection area, still used in re-
ent experiments and surveys [5,18] and works prior the release of
he updated NSL-KDD [20] despite being almost 20-years-old [55] .
he dataset contains the following attacks: DoS (Denial of Service),
2L (unauthorised access from remote), U2R (unauthorised access
o superuser/root functions) and Probing (gather network informa-
ion). 
(NK) NSL-KDD (2009) [16] . This dataset was created to solve
roblems in the KDD Cup 99 dataset as i) the presence of redun-
ant records in train sets, and ii) duplicates in test sets. The attacks
re the same as KC. 
(IX) ISCX (2012) [17] . It is generated by the Canadian Institute of
yberSecurity in a controlled environment based on a realistic net-
ork and traffic to depict the real effects of attacks over the net-
ork and the corresponding responses of workstations. Four dif-
erent attack scenarios are simulated: infiltration, HTTP denial of
ervice, a distributed denial of service by using an IRC botnet, and
SH brute-force login attempts. 
(UN) UNSW-NB15 (2015) [14] . This dataset was released by the
ustralian Defense Force Academy, University of New South Wale . Au-
hors simulate: i) Exploits, the attacker exploits a generic vulnera-
ility, ii) DoS, a (Distributed) Denial of Service, iii) Worms, a script
hat replicates itself to spread to other networked computers, iv)
eneric, a technique that works against all block-ciphers, with a
iven block and key size, v) Reconnaissance, attack that aim at
athering information, vi) Shellcode, a code used as the payload in
xploits, and vii) Backdoors, that stealthily bypass security mecha-
isms to access data. 
.2.2. Synthetic datasets 
To adequately support experiments in Section V, we also create
ub-datasets of NK, IX and UN with respectively 4 8.084, 122.14 8,
nd 44.353 data points without attacks. We left KC out because
ost of its characteristics are shared with NK, especially when fil-
ering out attacks. In addition, for each feature, we process sub-
atasets to calculate statistical indexes e.g., minimum and maxi-
um values, average, median, variance . These statistical indexes will
e used to inject anomaly classes into the sub-datasets, according
o their characterization in [1] . Despite injected anomalies do not
erfectly replicate manifestations of real attacks, we simulate them
o the best of our capabilities as follows: 
1. Point anomalies: some feature values are updated with values
that are either smaller than the minimum values or bigger than
the maximum values logged in the dataset for a given feature. 
2. Contextual anomalies: some feature values are updated with
values that are not contained in the 95% confidence interval,
considering the last 100 feature values as current context. 
3. Collective anomalies: we inject a collective anomaly as a set of
three subsequent data points where we updated some feature
values with values outside the 80% confidence interval, consid-
ering the last 100 feature values as current context. Collective
anomalies are not subsequent point or contextual anomalies;
therefore we used a different confidence interval to generate
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Table 2 
Unified Attack Model and Mapping of Specific Attacks. 
Attack Family Description Mapping of (Dataset) Attack 
Communication - Passive Attacks which targets the communication channel to 
gather information without active damage 
(KD - NK) Probing, (IX) Infiltration, (UN) 
Reconnaissance, (UN) Analysis 
Communication - Active Attacks conducted through the communication 
channel to actively damage the system 
(IX) Bruteforce, (KD - NK - IX - UN) DoS, (IX) 
DDoS, (UN) Fuzzers, (UN) Backdoor 
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4As a final step, we inject point, contextual and collective
nomalies in the sub-datasets, obtaining a 95% - 5% ratio of ex-
ected – anomalous data points. The resulting sub-datasets NK-S,
X-S, UN-S are available [21] . 
.3. Step C. unified attack model 
Each of the datasets above uses inconsistent naming and group-
ng of attacks. To perform cross-datasets comparisons, we adopt
he unified attack model that builds on [26,27,47] and is used in
46,48] . The model partition attacks in the following families: i)
ommunication passive : attacks directed to gather or steal data
hrough the passive observation of the communication channel, ii)
ommunication active : attacks which use the communication chan-
el as a way to send malicious data / requests to the target system,
ii) host : malware or malicious code injected in a target host ex-
loiting vulnerabilities of the operating system, and iv) application :
ttacks that exploits vulnerabilities of (web)services. The unified
ttack model is summarized in Table 2 . The table reports also the
apping of all the different attacks referenced in the datasets to
ach of the 4 attack families. As example, exploits attacks of UNSW-
B15 (UN) fall into the application family, as it can be observed at
he bottom right cell of the table. Attacks with different labels, or
eported in different datasets, which resemble the same attack are
erged into a unique attack, e.g., DoS, which can be found in both
SL-KDD (NK) and ISCX (IX) datasets. 
.4. Step D. Scoring Metrics 
The effectiveness of anomaly detectors is usually scored
hrough correct detections - true positives (TP), true negatives (TN)
 and wrong detections ( false negatives , FN), ( false positives , FP).
hese indicators are commonly used to derive the so-called con-
usion matrix . Aggregate metrics based on the abovementioned
ndicators are Precision, Recall (or Coverage ), False Positive Rate,
ccuracy, F-Score ( β) [18] , F-Measure (F1), Area Under ROC Curve
 AUC , [20] ) and Matthews Coefficient (MCC, [19] ). As highlighted in
49,53] , under specific circumstances some metrics can be mislead-
ng, since they either i) do not consider all the four classes of the
onfusion matrix i.e., F1, FScore( β), or ii) consider all the classes
ithout weighting the size of trues and falses i.e., Accuracy. To
uch extent, in this paper we mainly refer to MCC [19] , which does
ot show the weaknesses above. 
.5. Step E. tool support and experimental setup 
.5.1. Tool support 
To execute experiments, we need tools that allow i) executing
he selected algorithms, and ii) extracting the metrics above. Af-
er examining well-known frameworks as ELKI [22] , WEKA [23] or
andas [50] , our final choice has been RELOAD [36] , an open-
ource tool that embeds implementations from different frame-
orks and runs experiments through a simple and intuitive user
nterface. 
Briefly, RELOAD 1 automates the selection of the most relevant
eatures out of a data set or data stream, which is typically very1 RELOAD, GitHub Wiki, github.com/tommyippoz/RELOAD/wiki. 
4
 
t  mportant in attack detection to reduce the amount of data to be
bserved. Further, it includes built-in metrics for the evaluation.
he tool wraps the implementation of several unsupervised algo-
ithms, amongst those which are often deemed the most useful
24,35] for unsupervised anomaly detection in cyber-security. Ad-
itionally, it embeds automatic tuning of algorithms’ parameters,
nd facilitates examining outputs through reports of CSV files and
raphical plots. 
RELOAD also considers different decision functions to convert al-
orithms’ scores into boolean e.g., anomaly, normal, scores: out of
he pool of available ones, we chose IQR and Confidence Interval
39] , which RELOAD shapes depending on the characteristics of the
lgorithm. 
.5.2. Experimental setup 
We describe here the experimental setup we used throughout
he paper. Starting from the data sets, we downloaded the source
les of KC, NK, IX and UN from their repositories and we pre-
rocessed them to shape such data as csv files, which can be ef-
ciently processed by RELOAD. Then, we downloaded the latest
elease of RELOAD from the GitHub repository, setting up its pa-
ameters. We set MCC as target metric, using as feature selection
trategies the variance of feature values and their information gain
38] with respect to the label. We also proceed with a 10-fold sam-
ling of the training set as widely suggested [37] in the literature. 
We executed different experimental campaigns including all the
lgorithms considered in this study. Parameters tuning is adopted
y RELOAD to find an adequate setup of each instance of a given
lgorithm. Tuning is performed by i) first, executing training trying
ifferent combinations of parameters; ii) then, comparing results
or the different parameters. For example, we run kNN-dependent
lgorithms i.e., ODIN, FastABOD , with k  {1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100}.
n addition, metrics other than MCC e.g., TP, FP, TN, FN, Precision,
ecall, False Positive Rate, Accuracy and Area Under ROC Curve , are
eported for completeness and for easiness of comparison with ex-
sting studies. 
Machine to Execute Experiments. The experiments have been
xecuted on a server equipped with Intel Core i7-6700 with four
.40 GHz cores, 24GB of RAM and 100GB of user storage. Overall,
xecuting all the experiments supporting the quantitative analyses
eported in this paper required approximately three weeks of 24H
xecution. We choose the portions considering the biggest subset
f the dataset that do not escalate in heap memory errors, i.e., 16%
or KC, 33% for NK, 20% for IX, 24% for UN and all the NK-S, IX-S,
N-S synthetic datasets. All metric scores, RELOAD data logs and
les we used to collect and summarize values are publicly avail-
ble [21] . 
. Attack families that generate anomaly classes 
This section expands on qualitative and quantitative analysis di-
ected to identify the anomaly classes generated by the attacks con-
ained in the datasets IX, KD, NK, UN considered in the paper. 
.1. Inspection on the selected datasets 
.1.1. Attacks characteristics 
We first consider the characteristics of attacks to identify how
hey usually manifest. Attacks as Shellcode or Exploits (appearing in
6 T. Zoppi, A. Ceccarelli and L. Salani et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 52 (2020) 102474 
Fig. 2. Example of collective anomalies: subsequent occurrence of probe attacks portsweep and nmap – in yellow – and DoS attacks neptune and back – gray rows - in NK 
dataset (Test sub-dataset, rows 3889 - 3906). 
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l  the UN dataset) aim at damaging a system with single requests or
actions: therefore, we expect them to generate either point or con-
textual anomalies. Instead, attacks that submit several requests to
a victim will generate separate anomalies that share common char-
acteristics i.e., collective anomalies. Differentiating between attacks
generating point anomalies or contextual anomalies is not trivial:
in particular, it requires understanding if attacks act only in spe-
cific scenarios (context), and how they impact the victim. 
More in detail, Probing, Reconnaissance , and Analysis attacks
(e.g., PortScan [42] ) aim at scanning system interfaces or network
devices in order to determine vulnerabilities. This activity may be
leveraged through time, sending multiple ping or arp requests that
do not appear during normal operation conditions, generating col-
lective anomalies. Other attacks as Fuzzers and Bruteforce aim at
submitting inputs to a system to either block it or gain unautho-
rised access. Similarly, DoS attacks [26] aim to damage the vic-
tim leading to its unavailability. As example, denial of service may
be exercised by sending many requests (also from different adver-
saries networked together, as in Distributed DoS, DDoS ) or send-
ing malformed packets [40] , generating either collective or point
anomalies. 
Instead, we found that attacks belonging to the Host family in
Table 2 generate contextual anomalies as follows. These attacks ex-
ploit system vulnerabilities to execute scripts (as it is for Shellcode
or Backdoors ), software ( Worms, Malware ), or change/obtain per-
missions ( r2L , u2r ) by directly executing instructions on the vic-
tim machine. Such attacks need to damage the system as quickly
as possible, also hiding their activities (as it is common for Cam-
ouflaged Worms [41] ), to avoid being detected and quarantined by
antiviruses. Our conjecture is that they generate contextual anoma-
lies, impacting the system in a short timespan without relevant
fluctuations of feature values. For example, a worm may aim at
scanning the system for passwords and sending them to some
remote repository, or to change credentials for VPN or SSH ac-
cess on a machine: sending data or changing permissions are
not anomalies by themselves, but they are anomalous in specific
contexts. 
4.1.2. Manual inspections into datasets 
Similarly to what was done in the previous section for algo-
rithms, we verify our conjectures by examining how attacks man-
ifest in the NK, KD, IX, and UN datasets. Manual inspections allow
distinguishing which attacks appear as groups of anomalous data
points rather than attacks that affect single data points. Fig. 2 high-
lights a section of the NK Test (note that NK is provided as two
separate CSV files, one for train and one for test) dataset, where wean observe specific probing attacks as ipsweep, nmap, portsweep ,
r satan . 
Subsequent data points – rows in the dataset – are labelled
ith one of the attacks above i.e., last column of rows 3894 and
895 in Fig. 2 , either portsweep and nmap . For DoS attacks, in-
tead, datasets report both on single and groups of anomalies.
ig. 2 shows single (row 3901) and multiple occurrences of neptune
ttack (rows 3890, 3891), and also multiple occurrences of differ-
nt DoS attacks i.e., neptune and back , rows 3904 – 3906. 
.1.3. Deciding on point, contextual or collective anomalies 
If an attack always appears in subsequent data points, we
an definitively claim that such attack manifests as a collective
nomaly. Otherwise, examining the datasets to differentiate be-
ween point and contextual anomalies requires more effort. We
roceed as follows. We select the most relevant features of each
f the datasets by calculating Pearson correlation indexes between
ach feature of the datasets and the label column, considering the
abel as 0 if normal, 1 otherwise. Then, we select the 3 features
hat are more relevant: the bigger the absolute value of Pearson in-
ex, the greater the correlation with the label. Moreover, we rank
ll the data points in the dataset according to these feature values
nd we carefully examine the results: if most of the attacks are
ither at the beginning or at the end of the ranked dataset, this
eans that attacks lead one or more of these features to show val-
es outside the usual range, and therefore represent point anoma-
ies. 
In any other case, we check if such anomalies are contextual.
alues related to the three features are processed to extract statis-
ical indexes as average, median and standard deviation, differen-
iating between normal and anomalous data points. A noticeable
ifference between the two series of statistical indexes can sug-
est possible alterations due to this specific attack. Then, we select
 portions of the dataset in which the attack appears. Once we
nd a row with the attack we look at the context in which the
ttack is put (i.e., up to 30 rows before and up to 5 rows later)
o understand if, for some features, the data point corresponding
o the attack has values that differ with respect to the “surround-
ng” data points, according to the statistical indexes calculated
efore. 
.1.4. Example: backdoor attack 
To prove how our manual inspection works, we show as exam-
le the backdoor attacks, which we suspected to generate contex-
ual anomalies. To confirm or deny the initial hypothesis, we first
ook for datasets containing this attack (UN, see Fig. 3 ), observing
T. Zoppi, A. Ceccarelli and L. Salani et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 52 (2020) 102474 7 
Fig. 3. Example of contextual anomaly: occurrence of backdoor attack – in yellow 
– in UN dataset (rows 49,888 - 49,897). 
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c  hat data points labeled as backdoor attacks mainly come individ-
ally, excluding collective anomalies. We then execute the feature
election process using pearson index . Out of the possible 46 fea-
ures, the 3 that show higher correlation are rate (0.249 of pear-
on index), swin ( −0.247) and ct_dst_sport_ltm (0.357). Ranking the
ataset according to the values of these features does not show at-
acks that are concentrated either at the beginning or at the end:
herefore, we cannot classify backdoor attacks as point anoma-
ies. We then compute average, median and standard deviation
or each of the three features, differentiating normal and anoma-
ous data points. In particular, we notice how avg ± std values for
t_dst_sport_ltm are separated between normal (1.388 ± 0.847) and
nomalous (2.234 ± 0.656) values, indicating average higher val-
es of this feature in presence of attacks. Most of the data points
abeled as backdoor attacks in the dataset show different values
ith respect to their context. As example, row 49,896 in Fig. 3 is
he only data point that has value 2 for the ct_dst_sport_ltm feature
onsidering rows 48,866 – 49,900 (30 rows before the attack – 5
ows after the attack). 
Manual inspections, as shown above, are executed for each at-
ack that is logged in the considered datasets, while final results
re summarized in Table 3 and Table 4 . The tables report on
nomaly classes generated by i) attacks ( Table 3 ), and ii) attack
amilies ( Table 4 ). 
.2. Experimental analysis 
We now proceed to a dedicated quantitative analysis to con-
rm or deny manual inspections. Despite unsupervised algorithms
xecute training without relying on labels in the data, a tuning
hase is employed by RELOAD to derive the optimal values of the
arameters (e.g., the size k of the neighbourhood for kNN , when
eeded) for each algorithm. Tuning requires extracting a subset of
he dataset – the tuning subset - containing expected data pointsTable 3 
Attacks and Anomaly Classes they Generate. 
Attacks Datasets Anomalies 
Denial of Service KC, NK, IX, UN Point, Collective 
Distributed Denial of Service IX Contextual, Collective 
Probing / Reconnaissance KC, NK, UN Collective 
R2L, U2R KC, NK Contextual 
Infiltration, Bruteforce IX Collective 
Shellcode, Backdoors, Worms UN Contextual 
Fuzzers, Analysis UN Collective 
Exploits UN Point 
Table 4 
Attack Families and Anomaly Classes they Generate. 
Family Attacks Anomalies 
Communication 
- Passive 
Probing, Infiltration, 
Reconnaissance, Analysis 
Collective 
w
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g  nd data points collected while a given attack – the tuning attack –
as exercised, computing metric scores for each parameters’ com-
inations. 
Once the training-tuning phases are completed, algorithms are
eady to provide anomaly scores for data points in the evaluation
et . Using an evaluation set that contains a target attack other than
he tuning attack allows to completely decoupling the training-
uning phases from the evaluation, leading algorithms to detect
nknown attacks. Indeed, we expect to have higher detection scores
n detecting unknown target attacks that generate the same anomaly
lasses of the tuning attacks contained in the tuning subsets. There-
ore, we proceed as follows: 
• For each dataset we choose the target attack, identifying an
evaluation set containing both normal data points and data
points collected when the target attack was exercised. 
• We then identify different tuning subsets of the dataset con-
taining normal data points and data points related to an attack
(i.e., the tuning attack), other than the target attack. 
• Finally, we run experiments by training anomaly detection al-
gorithms with normal data points, tuning them using a tuning
subset, and then using trained algorithms to score the evalua-
tion set. 
.3. Results and discussion 
Table 5 reports on the analysis regarding three different tar-
et attacks: bruteforce (ISCX dataset), u2r (NSL-KDD), and worms
UNSW). For the full list of experiments please refer to the files
vailable at [21] . For each target attack we report on the average
nd standard deviation scores we obtained by training, tuning and
hen evaluating the 6 algorithms we used in this study. In addi-
ion, each row reports on i) the dataset used, ii) the target attack
nd the anomalies we suppose it generates, Ii) the tuning attack
nd the anomalies we suppose it generates. 
As it can be noticed in the table, highest MCC scores are ob-
ained when tuning attack corresponds to target attack . More im-
ortantly, we point out that when tuning attack and target attack
iffer, the highest scores are obtained when the anomalies generated
y the tuning attack match the anomalies generated by the target at-
ack. For example, Worms attacks (see the last batch of rows in
able 5 ) are on average identified with better scores by algorithms
f tuning is carried out using an tuning subset containing attacks
enerating contextual anomalies. The same trend can be observed
lso for U2R and Bruteforce attacks, as reported in rows 4–7 and
–11 of Table 5 . The results of this experimental campaign allow
onsolidating the link between attacks and anomaly classes that
as figured out, as a first stage, through manual inspections. 
. Detecting anomaly classes 
We discuss here how the characteristics of each algorithm impact
heir ability in identifying specific anomaly classes . Discussion is car-
ied out by revising algorithms as they were proposed, and then
orroborating initial conjectures with quantitative analyses. 
.1. Investigating characteristics of algorithms 
Each unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm relies on its
wn properties. According to their characteristics [4,7,10] , algo-
ithms belonging to neighbor-based, angle-based and density-based 
amilies such as ODIN, FastABOD and LOF are primarily intended
o identify point anomalies, while they may not be able to detect
ollective anomalies if the size k of the neighborhood is smaller
han the size of the collective group of anomalies. Indeed, an inde-
ree score may help detecting them, as demonstrated in [6] . This
8 T. Zoppi, A. Ceccarelli and L. Salani et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 52 (2020) 102474 
Table 5 
Detecting Unknown Attacks by Combining different Tuning Attack and Target Attack. 
Dataset 
Target Attack Tuning Attack MCC 
Name Anomaly Name Anomaly avg std 
IX Bruteforce Collective Bruteforce Collective 0.82 0.17 
IX Bruteforce Collective Infiltrator Collective 0.31 0.21 
IX Bruteforce Collective DoS Collective 
(Point) 
0.27 0.09 
NK U2R Contextual U2R Contextual 0.35 0.07 
NK U2R Contextual R2L Contextual 0.19 0.08 
NK U2R Contextual Probe Collective 0.05 0.04 
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t  issue is shared also with some implementations of KMeans (a clus-
tering algorithm), since a collective anomaly may lead them to cre-
ate a separate cluster for the particular group of data points. How-
ever, variants as [12] mitigate this problem by labeling as anoma-
lous both data points i) belonging to small clusters and ii) far from
known clusters. Classification algorithms for unsupervised anomaly
detection are often identified as One-Class SVM [9] . It is worth re-
marking that algorithms selected for this study – HBOS, KMeans,
FastABOD, LOF, ODIN and OneClass SVM – are intended to repre-
sent the intrinsic characteristics of different families, rather than
the most recent variants of existing algorithms. 
5.2. Experimental analysis 
Starting from the NK-S, IX-S and UN-S reported in Table 1 , non-
numeric features were removed, and feature selection was exe-
cuted by RELOAD, leaving 16 features for NK-S, 5 for IX-S, and 13
for UN-S. During the training phase, RELOAD respectively creates
38, 20, and 25 feature subsets according to Pearson Correlation . This
results in 42 feature subsets for NK-S, 26 for IX-S, and 39 for UN-
S, which sum i) the single features, ii) the connected features, and
iii) the set composed by all the single selected features. All the in-
stances are evaluated together during training phase and all the
possible algorithm configurations are ranked according to MCC. 
Fig. 4 shows the metric scores we obtain by running the se-
lected algorithms on our three synthetic datasets, and aggregat-
ing scores by algorithm and anomaly classes. Six series of three
columns can be found in the figure: the columns on the left re-
port on the detection of point anomalies, central columns report
on contextual anomalies, while columns on the right describe the
detection of collective anomalies. Such figure allows observing that
SVM shows the highest average scores, while sub-quadratic al-
gorithms as HBOS and K-Means show overall worse results i.e.,
bars are shorter in Fig. 4 . However, we can observe how algo-
rithms with lower bars may be really effective in detecting spe-
cific anomaly classes, i.e., KMeans and FastABOD . Point anomalies
are detected well by FastABOD (see columns on the left of eachFig. 4. Average metric scores of algorithms for each class of anomalies. Er-ror bars 
represent standard deviation among the datasets NK-S, IX-S, UN-S. 
F
briple of columns in Fig. 4 ), while KMeans show good capabilities
n identifying collective anomalies (columns on the right of the
riples in Fig. 4 ). ODIN and, to a lesser extent, LOF , are balanced
lgorithms: they do not show specific weaknesses for any anomaly
lass. Lastly, we remark how HBOS , despite not optimal in terms of
etric scores, is a light and fast algorithm, making it useful when
 computational resources are scarce. 
Overall, we expected point anomalies to be the easiest to de-
ect. Instead, except for the angle-based FastABOD , it was easier to
etect collective anomalies than contextual and point anomalies.
e explain this result as follows: the selected algorithms use large
raining sets, which allow a careful and precise definition of the
oundaries between anomalous and expected behavior. However,
uring training they derive a global boundary, which does not al-
ays fit the detection of single anomalies, while groups of anoma-
ous data points become easier to identify. 
.3. Results and discussion 
Overall, our results show which unsupervised algorithms are
ore suitable than others to detect anomalies belonging to spe-
ific classes. The final results of our analyses are depicted in Fig. 5 ,
hich is built considering algorithms as capable of identifying an
nomaly class if in our experiments the average MCC obtained
y the algorithm exceeds 0.6. We choose this MCC threshold by
onsidering each algorithm as capable of identifying at least an
nomaly class. 
We observe how Fig. 5 shows a few mismatches with respect
o our conjectures from Section 5.1. We supposed clustering al-
orithms to be capable of identifying both point and collective
nomalies, while Fig. 5 puts KMeans , the clustering algorithm, in
he intersection of “contextual” and “collective” sets. Instead, SVM
cores confirm that under average conditions i.e., the boundary
f SVM is found, this algorithms is the most balanced overall.
oreover, as reported previously, higher scores are obtained by
he algorithms that have quadratic computational complexity whileig. 5. Linking anomaly classes to algorithms depending on quantitative analyses 
y executing algorithms on datasets. 
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Table 6 
Metric Scores obtained by applying each algorithm on the datasets KD, NK, IX, UN. Results are grouped by Algorithm and Anomaly Class Generated by the Attacks Evaluated 
through Algorithms. 
Algorithm Anomaly 
TP TN FP FN 
FPR P R F1 ACC AUC 
MCC ( Fig. 6 ) Expected MCC ( Fig. 4 ) Diff wrt 
Expected 
% % % % avg std avg std 
HBOS Point 21.98 58.44 10.88 8.70 0.15 0.61 0.72 0.59 0.80 0.79 0.49 0.26 0.59 0.26 19.7% 
Contextual 5.75 86.26 5.10 2.89 0.06 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.92 0.74 0.47 0.29 0.63 0.05 32.1% 
Collective 5.34 81.24 5.95 7.47 0.07 0.49 0.52 0.46 0.87 0.73 0.41 0.09 0.63 0.06 55.0% 
K-Means Point 23.89 57.29 12.03 6.79 0.17 0.57 0.63 0.58 0.81 0.73 0.45 0.31 0.49 0.04 7.7% 
Contextual 5.88 85.11 6.25 2.76 0.08 0.54 0.59 0.47 0.91 0.76 0.47 0.21 0.60 0.23 27.4% 
Collective 7.97 83.04 4.15 4.83 0.05 0.66 0.58 0.58 0.91 0.77 0.56 0.21 0.75 0.07 35.4% 
LOF Point 19.93 62.62 6.70 10.76 0.11 0.66 0.71 0.60 0.83 0.80 0.50 0.14 0.66 0.18 29.8% 
Contextual 6.77 84.45 6.90 1.88 0.08 0.50 0.66 0.53 0.91 0.79 0.51 0.17 0.62 0.06 22.5% 
Collective 7.95 82.81 4.38 4.85 0.05 0.62 0.65 0.61 0.91 0.80 0.57 0.18 0.73 0.06 28.7% 
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a  aster algorithms as KMeans and HBOS showed worse detection ca-
abilities. 
. Applying algorithms to datasets 
We now apply the selected algorithms to datasets, analysing met-
ic scores to understand if they confirm or deny the results ob-
ained in Section 4 and Section 5. We skip qualitative analyses, go-
ng directly to experimental evaluations. 
.1. Experimental analysis 
We set an experimental campaign using the real datasets KD,
K, IX, and UN. We executed an experimental campaign by apply-
ng the 6 algorithms on the datasets KD, NK, IX and UN, according
o the procedure described in Section 4. In Fig. 6 we report results
f this experimental campaign, while the detailed metric scores are
n Table 6 . The results herein were obtained by applying the algo-
ithms on the datasets, then grouping by attacks and, ultimately,
y anomalies through the analysis in Section 4. 
.2. Results and discussion 
Focusing on Fig. 6 , we can observe that bars are lower then
heir counterparts in Fig. 4 . This is pointed out in the last col-
mn of Table 6 and is explained considering that synthetic datasets
ere artificially created by injecting anomalies with a common
attern, making their detection easier than real attacks. 
However, it is worth noticing that the characteristics of algo-
ithms are confirmed. Algorithms that were classified in Fig. 5 to
e particularly effective in detecting specific anomaly classes show
etric scores that comply with our expectations. LOF, ODIN and
VM (respectively, density-based, neighbor-based and classification )
ave good overall capabilities for all anomaly classes. Fast algo-
ithms as HBOS ( statistical ) and K-Means ( clustering ), instead, showig. 6. Average metric scores of algorithms for each anomaly class. Error bars rep- 
esent standard deviation among datasets KD, NK, IX, UN. 
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kesults that are on average worse than algorithms with quadratic
omplexity. Moreover, HBOS shows bad scores in identifying collec-
ive anomalies, while it was supposed to detect collective anoma-
ies quite well in Section 5. 
While all the algorithms show worse performance with respect
o the results on synthetic datasets (24.8% on average), FastABOD
hows scores that are similar to the analysis on synthetic datasets
14.4% worse on average), achieving the best average score in de-
ecting attacks generating point anomalies. 
. On the design of anomaly-based IDs 
The work described in the previous Sections allows establishing
inks between i) attacks – or attack families – and anomaly classes
hey usually generate (Section 4), and ii) algorithms and anomaly
lasses depending on detection capabilities (Section 5). These two
eparate studies – consolidated in Section 6 - constitute the base-
ine to derive the most suitable unsupervised anomaly detection al-
orithm(s) for intrusion detection in a given system . This ultimately
llows building guidelines to identify the most suitable anomaly
etection algorithms for a given system, assuming that the system
as enough computational, memory and storage resources to sup-
ort the algorithms execution. Here we have considered a represen-
ative set of algorithms and dataset, however our guidelines may be
eneralized for a selection of different algorithms, dataset and attacks.
Guidelines are summarized in Table 7 , where we give a brief
escription of possible attack families that can impact a system,
ointing out the anomaly classes they usually generate, and then
roposing algorithm(s) to apply for intrusion detection. More in
etail, Table 7 reports on all the 7 possible combinations of point,
ontextual and collective anomaly classes. The system administra-
or, the researcher or the practitioner that wants to take advan-
age of our design guidelines has to first devise a list of possible
ttacks that may threaten the system, building an attack model
.g. , DoS and probing attacks . Then, each attack of the attack model
hould be shaped according to the attack families we presented
n Table 2 e.g. , communication – active and communication – pas-
ive families . Once this model is done, attack families derived from
he attack model should be used to find a matching item in the
rst column of Table 7 (e.g., the third row of the table for com-
unication attacks). In this way, the user can get immediate recom-
endations about the most suitable algorithm(s) to adopt to detect
ntrusions as defined in the attack model . 
When devising an attack model is not possible or feasible, the
esearcher or practitioner may want to be covered against a wide
ange of attacks. To such extent, the last row of Table 7 reports on
lgorithms that showed overall good capabilities in detecting all
he three anomaly classes, meaning that they offer a balanced cov-
rage against most of the possible manifestations of attacks, either
nown or unknown. 
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Table 7 
Guidelines for Designing Intrusion Detectors based on Anomaly Classes. 
Attack Families Anomaly Classes Algorithms (Families) Motivation 
Application Point ODIN (Neighbour), 
FastABOD (Angle) 
They show good scores in detecting point anomalies. We 
may consider to use both strategies in parallel, since the 
core of ODIN and FastABOD share a kNN search. 
Host Contextual ODIN (Neighbour), SVM 
(Classification) 
SVM is a better choice if additional coverage against attacks 
generating collective anomalies is desired. Otherwise, SVMs 
fit the most here. 
Communication - 
Passive, 
Communication - 
Active 
Collective SVM (Classification), 
KMeans (Clustering) 
SVM shows the best detection capabilities in detecting 
collective anomalies. Clustering may be a good alternative if 
the system cannot rely on fast CPU or enough RAM memory 
Host, Application Point, Contextual FastABOD (Angle), ODIN 
(Neighbour) 
They show good capabilities in detecting both anomaly 
classes. 
Host, Communication 
- Passive 
Contextual, Collective SVM (Classification) It shows good capabilities in detecting both anomaly classes. 
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 Finally, in our analysis, we observe that all algorithms but HBOS
and KMeans rely on actions e.g., finding the k-NNs or creating
graphs, that are quadratic with respect to the amount of the data
points used for training. To mitigate this problem, in some scenar-
ios as the detection of attacks generating collective anomalies (see
third row of Table 7 ), it is possible to adopt algorithms that have
slightly worse detection capabilities, but on the other side require
considerably less resources for their training. Other possible solu-
tions could rely on sliding windows algorithms [12,13,43] , which
depend on a fixed size of data points to train their model, limiting
the effort required during training phase. However, despite show-
ing promising results in some application domains [45] , to the best
of our knowledge such strategies are not mature enough [44] for
being compared with more consolidated algorithms for detailed
analyses. 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper we described activities on attacks, anomalies and
unsupervised algorithms, which allowed deriving guidelines to se-
lect unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms for intrusion de-
tection. Guidelines constitute the last step of a process which al-
lowed: i) to characterize known attacks in terms of the anomaly
classes they usually generate, i) to study suitability of anomaly
detection algorithms to detect anomaly classes, iii) to establish a
link between anomaly detection algorithms and attacks through
anomaly classes, iv) and to take advantage of the link to propose
guidelines to select unsupervised algorithms. Steps i) – iii) started
from qualitative analyses then substantiated by quantitative ones
using state-of-the-art algorithms, attack models and datasets. All
data generated for these quantitative analyses is publicly available
[21] , as well as the tool used for the experiments [36] . 
Overall, such analyses escalated into guidelines to derive the
most suitable unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm for intru-
sion detection in a given system depending on anomaly classes. In
addition, we carefully described the methodology we followed, to
promote further expansions of our work e.g., by considering un-
supervised algorithms other than the 6 we took into account. Our
guidelines could also be used to suggest a set of unsupervised al-
gorithms: however, to the best of our knowledge, there are no
consolidated mechanisms that allow combining individual anomaly
scores of different algorithms in an efficient and trusted manner. 
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